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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~IILLEH.~' ~rr·rrL~AL INSlTRANCE 
.\SSOCI .. \TION, 
Plai.ntiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
lft.JLIXE TRANSP'ORT, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent . 
. A.PPELLANT'S BRIEIF 
Case No. 9996 
ST~\TEMENT OF FACIT•S 
ST.\TE~[}~X1, OF TilE KI~D OF CAS·E 
ThiB iB an. aetion for recovery of a subroga~ion claim 
arising out of a collision \vhere the automobile of the 
plaintifr·~ in~ured ""as totally destroy~d by the admitted 
nt?g-ligence of the defendant in driving defendant's large 
truck onto the ""I~ong ~ide of the highway. 
The rase \\~as submitted to the trial judge on a writ-
ten stipulation of fact·, and \vritten memorandums of au-
thority. Frotn a judgn1ent of no cause of action, plaintiff 
appeal~. 
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RELIEF SOUGH'T ON AP'PEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment, and judg-
nlent in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
STATE:.\IENT OF F AC'TS 
This appeal arises from an accident which occurred 
on High\vay 40 near Stra\\~berry Reservoir, ''T asatC'h 
County, l~tah, on ~1:ay 17, 1960. It is admitted that 
the defendant Hi-Line Transport, Inc., negligently drove 
a large Peterbilt diesel truck and semi-trailer loaded with 
bricks onto the \vrong side of the highway and hy this 
negligence caused the truck to strike head on and totally 
demolish a new Buick owned by Donald Ray1ner, a fact 
observed and known by defendant. The appellant herein, 
Millers' l\1 utual Insurance Association, insured the Buick 
and paid $33-±0.50 less deductible of $50.00 and salvage of 
$648.50 for a net loss of $2642.00, becoming subrogated 
to the claim of $2642.00. (Record 20, para. -±).It is stipu-
lated that the negligence of defendant Hi-Line Transport, 
Inc., (hereafter referred to as Tortfeasor or Hi-Line) 
\\~as thP sole proxi1nate cause of the collision and da1nage 
(Record 22, para. 15.). Hi.JL~ine thereby became liable to 
the .:\ ppe llant for $~()4-:2.00. 
This case presents an effort by the Tortfeasor-
Respondent, Hi-Line 'Transport, Inc., to evade the lia-
bility for the subrogation claim. 
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II i-1 Jine earried liability insurance with Central 
ca~unlt y InsuraiH'e Cotnpany. (Record 13, 23-26, 20 para. 
I ) . 
Hy thP insuring agree1nent (Record 13 and 23-26) 
I-Ii-Line Transport, Inc. constituted Central Casualty 
l'otnpany the agent of Hi-Line Transport, Inc. to "make 
:-;uch in\·Pstigation, negotiation and settlement of any suit 
a:-; it (lPPtns expediPnt." (Record 13 and 24, Insuring 
.\~n·PnlPnt, paragraph II a). 
By its actions after the accident Hi-Line further con-
firnu.•(l and constituted Central Casualty Company and 
its reprPsPntatives as the agents of Hi-Line to handle 
t lw nPg-otiation and adjustment of the claim by entrusting 
to c~·ntral Casualty Company and its organization of ad-
.in:-;tprs. invPstigators and attorneys the responsibility 
for aet ing for and on behalf of Hi-Line by: 
(a) Giving Central Casualty Company and its 
r~prt·~PntativPs notice of the accident pursuant to the 
poliey. (Reeord 13 and 25, Conditions Paragraph 1). 
(b) Referring to Central Casualty Company and 
it:-; representativPs the rlaims and suits of Appellant-
~ubrogee and of RaYJner, pursuant to the policy. (Rec-
ord 13 and :25, Conditions, Para. 2). 
(e) Cooperating fully in having Central Casualty 
Con1pany and its representative handle the claims and 
:'Hit~ pursuant to the poliry (Record 13 and 26, Condi-
tion~. para. lS). 
The ... \ppellant-Subrogee demanded payment of the 
Tortf~·a~~n· and "yas referred to the insurance adjusters 
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4 
for Hi-Line, Homer Bray Service, Inc., which was en-
trusted with the responsibility of negotiating and adjust-
ing the Tortfeasor's liability. 
Raymer sued the Hi-Line in Salt Lake County for 
only the $50.00 deductible portion of the loss to the new 
Buick, \vhich was da1naged so badly as to be beyond re-
pair, along with l~ay111er's personal injuries. (Record 21, 
para. 8). The co1nplaint in the Salt Lake County action 
was served upon Hi-Line Transport, Inc., and the com-
plaint gave full and further reminder and notice to Hi-
Line that Raymer's claim in the Salt Lake County suit 
did not include the subrogation claim for damage paid by 
the collision carrier for Mr. Raymer. 
Raymer's attorney, Glen M. Hatch, prior to filing 
suit advised the subrogee, Millers' Mutual Insurance As-
sociation, of the projected suit and inquired about the 
subrogee's intentions concerning suit. To determine 
whether suit \Yas necessary to recover on the subrogation 
claim subrogee therl·upon \vrote a letter to Homer Bray 
Service, Inc. (Record :27) \\'"herein the Subrogee stated 
its understanding that Central Casualty Company was 
handling the 1natter for Hi-Line T·ransport, Inc., and in-
quired whether Hi-Line's agent would give due considera-
tion to the subrogation claim after having disposed of 
tht• personal injury action. The subrogee indicated it 
\\'"ould sue unless it \vas assured that its claim would be 
dealt with separately on the merits after Raymer's liti-
gation. 'The subrogee stated, Hin the absence of some as-
surance that Central Casualty will consider our subroga-
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tion at'tPr the other cases are out of the way, we will 
naturally be forced to take other action to protect our 
intt~r .. ~t~.'' (Record 27). 
llotuer Bray Service, Inc. (acting under the agent's 
authority provided in iii-Line's policy, and pursuant to 
the authority ari~ing fron1 the acts of the Tortfeasor in 
turning the investigation, adjustment and negotiation 
o\"<'1' to the personnel, organization and apparatus main-
tainl'd hy Central Casualty Company for that purpose) 
replied to the subrogee by letter. (Record 28). Therein 
HotnPr Bray Service, Inc., as representative of the Tort-
fpa~or·~ intt'l't'~t~, acknowledged the subrogee's claim, re-
qlll'~tl'd proof as to the details and the amount, and indi-
catt'd that the subrogated claim would be considered sepa-
ratPly on it~ 1nerits upon the termination of the person-
al injury claim. 
Hi-Line's agent wrote to the Subrogee (Record 28): 
"'This 'vill acknowledge receipt of your letter 
of February 17, 1961 and we shall appreciate re-
eei\ing photostatic copy of your Proof of Loss to-
gether "~ith the draft in payment. 
H You are correct. ''T e have not been able to 
di~pose of the injury claims and when they ar~ 
out of the 1cay zoe 1cill certainly be more than 
happy to give your subrogation claim considera-
f £o·n. ( E1nphasis- added.) 
HThanking you for your cooperation ... " etc. 
Acting in reliance on the above representation of Hi-
Lin(\\~ agent the .....-\ppellant-Subrogee in good· faith re-
t'rainPd front joining its claim in the Raymer suit in Salt 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Lake County, and advised ~Ir. Hatch accordingly. Hi-
Line, represented by L. E. l\lidgley, defended the Salt 
Lake County suit, "Therein it \Yas apparent that the sub-
rogation claim \Yas not included. No move was ever made 
in the Salt Lake County action to join the Subrogee, and 
no notice was ever given the subrogee during the penden-
cy of the Salt Lake County action that the promise to 
consider the subrogation claim separately and later on 
its merits 'vould not be honorPd on completion of the Salt 
Lake County action. 
The Salt Lake County action ended in a verdict for 
Raymer and against Hi-Line Transport, Inc. and the 
judgment \vas paid. The subrogee, l\liller's Mutual In-
surance Association, then requested payment of the 
subrogation claim. The claim of the subrogee was now 
rejected because it \vas ·~attempting to split a cause of 
action." (Record 29). In the meanwhile, Central Cas-
ualty Company \vent into receivership, and the Tort-
feasor, Hi-Line Transport, lne. refused to recognize ib 
liability to the subrogee. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., having 
accepted the benefits of the actions of Central Casualty 
Con1pany and the adjusters and attorneys in investigat-
ing, negotiating and defending its claims rejected the 
obligations arising from its agents' actions. 
~fillers' ~I utual Insurance Association therefore had 
~lr. Hatch file the present \\T asatch County action from 
'"·hich this appeal arises. 
1Tpon refusal of Hi-Line to pay the subrogated claim, 
subrogee, pursuant to 31-5-15 UCA, 1953, instituted suit 
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in the nntne of Donald ~L RaytnPr as provided by statute 
{ ltPeo rd 1) : 
:~ 1-.-l-13. ~arne in "·hich business conducted -
~ubrogation-Liinitations on assumption of na1ne. 
( 1) I~~aeh insurer shall conduct its business in its 
o\\·n legal name, except that in subrogation actions 
it tnay sue in the name of its assured. 
By <·onrt order plaintiff -subrogee later appeared by 
it~ own natne. (Record 18). 
ThP t'aet~ \VPre not in dispute in the Wasatch County 
ease. and it appeared to involve only a legal question : 
\Ya~ the Tortfeasor-Respondent relieved of 
it~ liability to the plaintiff on the subrogation 
claim by reason of the fact that Homer Bray 
Sl\rvieP, Inc. by its representation induced the 
subrogee to refrain from joining its subrogation 
rlai1n in the Salt Lake County action~ 
Trial counsel therefore submitted the issue to the 
trial court upon a "'"ritten stipulation of facts (Record 
~0. ~1, :2:2) and men1orandums of legal authority. 
By Inemorandum Hi-Line argued to the trial court: 
(a) The Tortfeasor 'vas not bound by the actions 
of thn~P to \\~hon1 it had entrusted the responsibility to 
act in TortfPasor's behalf to investigate, negotiate and 
dt\fend the clain1s, though it had accepted the benefits 
nf tho~p actions. (Record 50-52). 
(b) That only one cause of action existed, and the 
rule against splitting n cause of action 'vas strict, abso-
lut\·, 'Yithout exe.eption, and not subject to 'vaiver or es-
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toppel by actions of a defendant-tortfeasor's agents. 
(Record 49-50). 
(c) That the Salt Lake County action (in which Ap-
pPllant-Subrogee was not a party and from ''Thich the 
subrogation claim with the knowledge of all concerned 
was o1nitted) though it found Hi-Line liable, was res 
judicata on the subrogation claim. (Record 46-48). 
The trial court accepted defendant's view of the law. 
The trial court, after finding facts as stipulated (Record 
35) concluded as a matter of law (Record 35) : 
1. The Salt Lake County action constituted res 
judicata of the subrogation claim. 
2. The Wasatch County action attempted to split a 
cause of action. 
3. Neither Defendant-Tortfeasor nor defendant's 
insurance company "consented that plaintiff's cause of 
action be split." 
Appellant-Subrogee contends the trial cou:r;t \vas mis-
f!•l1 i/P..SIDn,.S ~ /£-~ 
led into error of la,v, that the finding C S d are con-
trary to thP facts and the la,v, and that appellant is en-
titled to judg1nent as a matter of law. 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLAN'T MADE NO IMPROPER AT-
TEMPT TO S'PLIT A OAUSE OF ACTION. 
'Vith tlH\ great increase in auto insurance and re-
lated litigation in recent decades practically all jurisdic-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
tion~ hn vP rP<·ognizPd in one 'vay or another that so1ne 
insurntH'l' subrogation clai1ns n1ust in justice and equity 
;-;nnwtitnP~ hP tried in separab~ actions from the clai1n of 
tht~ in~HI'P<l. 
Paragraph ~' Conclusions of Law (Record 35) is con-
trary to the fact and the la,v. The trial court erred in 
al'et'pting defendant's contention that the subrogation 
al'tion n1ust ahvays without exception be adjudicated in 
the ~'utll' action as the owner's damages . 
.. \. That an insurance subrogation claim may be 
t rt'ated separately is recognized by the well-established 
rule that a tort-fL'asor or his representative with knowl-
edge of the existence of subrogation rights by the other 
party·~ insurer n1ay not defeat that right by any type of 
~l'ttle1nent 'Yith the insured without the insurer's consent. 
HiThe right of subrogation accruing to an in-
suranee company to recover from a tort-feasor, 
through 'Yhose negligence the loss was incurred, 
the runount paid on its policy of insurance, is not 
barred by a settlement bet,veen the tort-feasor and 
the o'vner for a sum less than the actual liability 
of the forn1er, and for 'vhich the latter gave a full 
release, for such a release is a fraud upon the sub-
rogee ''"hich 'vill be no defense either at law or in 
l\quity to its action to recover the loss remaining 
unsati~fied after applying to its action to recover 
the loss re1naining unsatisfied after applying to 
it~ ~atisfaction the su1n paid by the tort-feasor." 
1-,;re .Assn. of Plzila. v. Wells, 8-! N.J. Eq. 484, 94 A. 
ti19, L.R.A .. 91ti.A .• 1:2SO, Ann. Cas. 1917 A 1296. See also 
Ca1nden Fire Ins ... :1ss'n. r. Preziozo, 93 X.J. Eq. 48~, 116 
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A. 694 ( 1922,). Both ca~es have been much quoted and 
followed. 
""The right of subrogation is based upon prin-
ciples of equity and natural justice, and courts 
have liberally applied the principles of subroga-
tion for the protection of those \Yho are its natural 
beneficiaries." 
Bahn v. Shaler, D. C. niun. App., 125 A. 2d 67~ 
(1956). 
See also City of r/ ezr York Ins. Co. r. Tice, 159 Kan. 
176, 152 P. 2d 836 (1944); Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry. 
Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 183 Ind. 335,108 N.E. 
525 (1915); Potomac Ins. Co. 1;. JJ!acNaughton, 77 N.Y.S. 
2d 110,191 ~lise. 362 ( 1948) ; Ocean Ace. & Guarantee 
Corp. 1:. Hooker Electrochrnzical Co., 240 N.Y. 37, 147 
N.E. 351 (1925); Security Storage & Van Co. r. General 
Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 310 S.W. 2d 729 (1958). 
B. Some jurisdictions hold the subrogee has a sepa-
rate cause of action. 
In J/idelity & Guaranty Fire Corporation t~. Silrcr 
Fleet il1 otor E.rp., 242 Ala. 559, 7 So. 2d 290 (1942) (sub-
rogee of da1nage clai1n to truck sued tortfeasor after own-
er of truck had sued and recovered da1nage to cargo) the 
court upheld the right of the insurer to sue as subrogee 
in a subsequent action, follo,ving Underwriters at Lloyd's 
Ins. Co. r. T'ickslnrrg Traction Co., 106 ~1iss. 255, 63 So. 
4:J3, 51 L.R.A., N.S. 319 (1913): 
"There \\'"ere then tu~o distinct causes of ac-
tion, t\\'"O separate rights to recover, in t\vo differ-
ent persons.'" (emphasis added). 
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.. PotPntially, the in~Ul'<'l' had an interest in the 
•·:t rg·o, as again~t a tort-f(•asor, \\·hen the injury 
occurred. Basi<'ally Pvery on(~ should have his 
day in ('ourt in fa<'t, not InerPly hy a nominal party 
not intPrP~t<'d in protecting his interest. 
"()n sn<'h rPasoning, \\·e eonf'lude the doctrine 
ot' ~plitting a cause of action is not applicable 
hen•." 
S Coueh on Insurance (First Ed. 1959 R.eprint), § 
~U~9. page (j(i(i7 ~tatPs tlH· rule as follo\VS: 
H X or is an insurer of an automobile, \Yhich, 
in a<'cordaneP \rith a provision of the policy, had 
bProine ~nbrogated to the claim of the owner for 
drunage thereto against the \Vrongdoer before the 
in~titution by such o\vner of a suit for personal 
injuriP~. growing out of the same accident, in 
"·hieh a judgment had been recovered, precluded 
thPrehy from 1naintaining an action on the theory 
that the injury to the automobile and the personal 
injuriP~ constituted but one cause of action, and 
eould not be split so that separate suits could be 
brought: since, \vhen the the owner of the automo-
bile instituted suit for his injuries, he had no cause 
of action for da1nage to the automobile, this right 
of action having been transferred to the insurer 
in pursuanct> of the conditions of the policy, so 
that the t\vo causes \Yere then in different per-
~ons .. , 
29.A ... .-\111. J ur .. InsurancP, § 1734-, p. 811 states: 
··. . . an insurer of an automobile who has, in 
accordance "~ith a provision of the policy, become 
:'Ubrogated to the elaim of the owner for damages 
thereto against a tortfeasor before the institution 
by ~neh o""ller of a suit for personal injuries gro\v-
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ing out of the same accident, in which a judg1uent 
has been recovered, is not precluded thereby fro1n 
maintaining an action." 
The case of General E.rchange Insurance Corpora-
tion c. lyoung, Jl!o. App., 206 S.W. 2d 683 (19-!7) involved 
a suit by a plaintiff-subrogee against the tortfeasor. Pre-
viously the plaintiff's insured had brought suit for pPr-
sonal injury and secured a settle1nent from the liabilit~· 
carrier of the tortfeasor-defendant. The release signed 
by the plaintiff's insured was a broad general release spe-
cifically including the property damage upon which the 
subrogee based its claim. The evidence indicated that 
the tortfeasor was not specifically informed about the 
subrogation, but that a representative of the defendant's 
liability insurance company kne'v about the subrogation 
rights. 'The court held that the defendant through his 
liability carrier and the agents of the liability carrier had 
impliedly consented to the splitting of the cause of action 
and that the plaintiff-subrogee should prevail. The court 
stated (page 689): 
u Any other result "\Yould be rt~pugnant to th<' 
general principle of equity upon which the courts 
have ahvays held the right of subrogation rests. 
If not adopted ... the wrongdoer and his insur-
ance carrier "~auld go scot free of liability for 
da1nage to the auto1nobile, and Ella Sw·isher 'vho 
suffered the damage would ultimately receive no 
compensation therefor. It would also place a pre-
Jniunz on fraud aud dishonesty.'' (en1phasis added) 
~.ehe Supre1ne Court concluded by saying: 
'~ ... (T)he facts in the instant case furnish 
a reasonable exception to the rule against split-
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ting; or perhaps; it is more accurate to say there 
has been 'llO split of the cause of action, but the 
cr('at ion of two separate ca~tses of action. ( empha-
~is added) . 
.. 'rhe husiness of insuring o"\vners of n1otor 
vehiclPs against property damage by collision, is 
lPgitimate, useful, and \Yidespread. By the insur-
anee contract, before any cause of action accrues, 
t hP insured obligates itself to pay the owner any 
property da1nages he may suffer under the condi-
tions of the policy, with the right of subrogation 
to the insurer as to any such damages caused by 
the fault of another. 'Thus the insurer stands al-
tnost1 but not quite, in the relation of surety to the 
insured . ..:\t the moment an insured vehicle is dam-
agP<l or destroyed by the fault of a third person 
the insurer has a contingent interest in any re-
COVl\ry of da1nages to the extent of its liability 
to the o'vner. That interest becomes a vested right 
to reimbursement from the third person when the 
i n~urer discharges its policy obligation to the 
. d " Insure .... 
C. ()ther jurisdictions hold that the insurance sub-
rogation ~ituation constitutes an established exception 
to the rule against splitting a cause of action. 
In Rosenthal v. Scott, Fla., 150 So. 2d 43B 
\ Dl~l'. ti. 1961; on rehearing, Feb. 22, 1963) the Supreme 
Court of Florida con1pletely reversed its decision on first 
ht'nring and ruled that .even though the subrogee~insurer 
of the injured party had filed suit for d;;tmages to the 
autotnobile of the insured's automobile, had had the suit 
di~nu~:'Pd "~ith prejudice, the insured might nevertheless 
hring a ~eparate action against the same alleged tort-
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feasor for injuries to his person. ThP court did not l'P-
nounce the rigid doctrine that there shall not be splitting 
of a cause of action, but held that the peculiar circum-
stances of an automobile indemnity subrogation 1nade 
it absolutely necessary in the interests to allow the sub-
rogor and the subrogee to bring separate actions: 
""We again recognize the 1najorit~· rulP against 
splitting a cause of action, but we do not belit1V( 1 
that said rule is controlling under the facts of this 
case. The application of said rule herein without 
recognizing the· insurance exception 1Dould in our 
judgment defeat the ends of justice ... Oft'times, 
\vhen an automobile accident results in property 
damage and personal injuries the ultimate extent 
of the personal injuries, as opposed to the amount 
of the property damages, may not be readily as-
certainable. So long as the magnitude of the in-
juries to the person are known before the expira-
tion of the statutory period within which a tort 
action may be begun by the person whose property 
""as damaged and \Yho suffered personal injuries 
should be permitted to 1naintain a suit against the 
\\'"rong-doer regardless of the fact that he may 
have, under the exigencies of the situation, settled 
\vith an insurance carrier the matter of property 
da1nages." (Emphasis added.) 
The court further stated: 
"To hold that under such circumstances the 
innocent party had split his cause of ~c~io~ a~d 
waived his right to sue for personal InJUries IS 
unthinkable If a so-called subrogated insurer must 
wait for perhaps several years to recover the 
1noney darnage or by filing its claim can force ~he 
hz)1prrd person to bring a personal injury act1on 
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JJI't•nut!Hrcly, before the total extcut of his injur-
it:s arc know 11, the 11, au d in that event there is 
sornet hi 11 !1 tc ro 11 !J II' i th the huo. We can not be 
persuaded that u·e shollld create a truisn~ out of 
th(' hackucyed .satr: ·Jt's alllazo aud no justice.'" 
( l d. at page 43S.) ( E1nphasis added.) 
"TltP underlying rl~ason for the rule against 
~plitti.ng a cause of action is salutary. The rule 
ha~ a~ its purposP, as every student of the law 
kno\\·~, ~that litigation should have an end and 
that no pPr~on should be unnecessarily harassed 
with a multiplicity of suits.' However, a rule such 
as the one under consideration should not be de-
cia n·d rigid, inflc.rible, and inexorable when such 
dt·claratiou would in 1nany, ;nany instances, for 
the only of cout~·cuicnce to a putative wrongdoer, 
defeat the r11ds of justice" (Emphasis added.) 
'
4 \\\\rP "~e to adhere to said rule and declare 
it to be unyielding in this case, or in any other 
ea~P 'Yith a silnilar factual setting, '""e would, in 
our judgn1ent, be guilty of making a mockery of 
t hP funda1nental purpose of all courts in this 
country-administration of simple, 'even-handed' 
ju~tice. 
'• Every court in this land in spirit if not in 
fact ha~ emblazoned OYPr its portal in box-car 
lPtter~: ·Fiat Justicia.' ''Te pray it may ever re-
nlain ~o:· (I d. at pages -±39·-440.) 
The reasoning of the Florida Supreme c·ourt in 
Rosenthal l\ Scott raises an interesting question in Utah 
'vhere the property damage is subject to a three year 
~tatute of li1nitations and personal injuries are subject 
to a four year ~tatnte of li1nitations. If separate subroga-
tion :-:nit t'annot be brought in l~tah, under the theory that 
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there are actually two causes of action, or that the situ-
ation constitutes an exception to the rule against split-
ting one cause of action, or that the tortfeasor is estopped 
to assert such a defense, \vhat must the subrogee do 
"'here the insured takes no action or waits until the 
fourth year to commence action~ 
a. Let the three year statute of limitations run on 
the subrogation claim~ 
b. Deprive the insured of the fourth year of the 
statute of limitations by forcing suit within 
three years~ 
c. Sue but omit the insured's claim and risk giving 
the tortfeasor defense against the insured of res 
judicata or splitting a cause of action~ 
d. Risk the accusation of barratory by urging or 
stimulating the insured to bring suit~ 
In Hi-Line's 1ne1norandun1 "\Yhich led the trial court 
into error, defendant cites as favoring its position 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Jlloorc, 304 Ky. 456,201 S.W. 
2d 7 (19·47). Actually, that case supports appellant. 
There, as in this instant case, plaintiff paid for 
property da1nage to its insured's automobile. The in· 
sured sued defendant for personal injury and collected. 
Plaintiff then sued defendant for the damage done to the 
insured's automobile as subrogee of the insured. On ap-
peal, the plaintiff prevailed, the court stating: 
"Whether or not the exception to the rule 
against splitting causes of action in favor of a 
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subrogee so as to give hi1n an independent right 
of action against the \Vrongdoer for the amount 
he was eompelled to pay under his insurance con-
tract, is onP of first impression in this court. But 
thP reasoning of the minority of the courts so 
declaring ilnpresses us as the more logical one, 
and that the general rule against splitting single 
causes of action is not one that is immune from 
exceptions when under facts and conditions, as 
appear in this case, the adoption is necessary to 
completP protection and enforcement of the rights 
of all part iPs ... " ( 201 S. -\V. 2d at Page 11). 
CitPd "·ith approval in Sharp v. Bannon, Ky. App., 258 
~.\Y. ~d 713 (1953). 
Again, Iii-Line's 1nemorandum inadvertently misled 
the trial court in citing Spargur v. Dayton Power and 
Li_qht Co •. 7 Ohio Ops. 2·d 138, 152 N.E. 2d 918 (1958) as 
~upporting defendant's claim that a subrogee may not 
tnaintain an action for property damages after the 
in~nrPd-~nhrogor has 1naintained an action for personal 
injury. In fact the Ohio court held the exact opposite. 
The Spargur case is somewhat involved, and a care-
ful reading is necessary to grasp the holding of the court. 
Hi-Line'~ n1en1orandum to the trial court lifted language 
frotn its context of a broad discussion in such a way that 
the quotation 1nisrepresented in its application to the 
pr()~Pnt case of the la'v of Ohio as enunciated in Spargtttr 
t'. Dayton Power & Light Co. 
~·t~pon further examination of the cases. from 
other jurisdictions, it appears that in those in-
stances "'"here the courts have held to a majority 
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rule, a separate cause of action is ahnost univer-
sally recognized \vhere an insurer has acquirPd by 
an assignment or by subrogation the right to re-
cover for n1oney it has advanced to pay for prop-
erty damage .... " 
The quotation cited in Hi-Line's memorandum refers 
to the fact that the assignee is bound by the drterinina-
tion of those issues decided in the case involving the as-
signor, in the ~pargur case the issues of negligence and 
causation. The court in the Spargur case specifically up-
held the right of a subrogee-assignee to maintain a sepa-
rate action for damages against a tortfeasor when the 
insured had already obtained a judgment against the 
tortfeasor for personal injuries. 
Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co., et al. (supra) 
so far as the facts apply to those in this appeal, held thP 
opposite of the meaning conveyed in defendant's memo-
randuin of authority to the trial court. !The holding of 
the case as related to the facts on this appeal is accur-
ately set forth in head note number 2: 
"\\:--here a party suffering property damage 
and personal injuries based upon same alleged 
negligence recovers from insurer for property 
damage, instead of having a separate cause of 
action for property damage apart from personal 
injury action, there exists only a separate right of 
action exclusively in assignee to prosecute sepa-
rate action against party causing injury for re-
imbursement for inde1nnity 1noneys paid under 
insurance contract." (Emphasis added.) 
'The court of course recognized that a particular in-
jured party n1ay 1naintain one action against the tort-
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fpa:o:or for all (laBtag-P~ rpsulting to that party resulting 
front tht• wrongful aPt. This is a proposition about which 
wt~ ar~· uot in dispute in this action, ",.here we are con-
cPrrH·d with thP right of an insuraneP subrogee to bring a 
~~'}Htrat" a<'t ion under thP particular circumstances here 
t~xi:-:t ing. 
Tht~ Spargur suit \\,.a~ against multiple defendants, 
tht• po\\·Pr and light co1npany on the one hand ('vhich 'vas 
l'onn<l in thP n<'tion of thP insured for personal injuries 
to hP liable hy n•ason of its negligence) and four other 
dPfPndnnt~ on thP oth<·r hand who were builders and con-
tr:H·tor~ ~found in the insured's action not to be negli-
.~·t•nt). Tht• ea~P of Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co. 
allo\VPd the subrogee 'vho had paid property da1nage 
to pro<•t•t~d ",.ith a second action against the power and 
light COlllpany. 
'rhe court held that one "'"ho acquires an interest in 
a t:lainl aftl•r litigation has been commenced is in privity 
\Vith the assignor and would be bound by the findings 
and judgn1ent in the assignor's action. The court stated 
(pagp D~7): 
··Jn a subsequent action the insured and the 
\vrongdoer are bound by a finding on the issue 
of negligence and contributory negligence. If the 
finding is adrerse to the wrongdoer, the court 
1nerely assigns for trial the subject of the assign-
lnent or subrogation and the exteut of the d(nn-
Oflt't'." 
The court ~tated (page 927) : 
··\\~here t'vo separate suits arise out of a sin-
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gle cause of action but do not involve the same 
claim the parties and their privies are not 'bound 
by the judgment' but they may not relitigate simi-
lar issues and they may litigate those issues which 
were not or could not have been resolved in the 
original action. 32 Ohio J ur. 2d, 58'; 30 Amer., 
J ur. 403. In a subsequent action the insurer and 
the wrongdoer are bound by the finding on an 
issue of negligence and contributory negligence. 
If the finding is adverse to the wrongdoer, the 
court merely assigns for trial the subject of the 
assignment or subrogation and the extent of the 
damages." 
Hi-Line has similarly completely misconstrued Sec-
tion 84 of the Restatement of Judgments. The Ohio court 
in the Spargur case interprets this section as binding 
the assignee only with regard to negligence or contribu-
tory negligence and causation. The assignee may still 
maintain a separate action for damages: 
"It is logical and 'vell within public policy that 
an adverse finding on either the issue of negli-
gence or contributory negligence in the principal 
action should estop the insurer in the separate 
action." (152 N.E. 2d at page 927). 
But note that the court upholds the insurer's right to 
bring the •·separate action." 
The correct interpretation of Section 84 of the Re-
statement of Judgments is seen when we read together 
subsections (a) and (b) as quoted in the Spargur case: 
" 'Where a judgment is rendered in an action 
in 'vhich a party thereto properly acts on behalf 
of another, the other is 
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(a) bound by and entitled to the benefits of 
the rules of res judicata with reference to 
~uch of his intPrests as at the ti1ne are con-
troll('d by the parf,IJ to the action; 
(h) not bound by or entitled to the benefits 
of thP rules of res judicata with referencP 
to hi~ interests not controlled by the party 
to fh(' action .' ,.,. (15:2 N.E. 2d at page 923. 
En1phasis added.) 
In thP ~pargur easP, subsection (a) refers to the 
i~~llt'~ of nPgligencP and contributory negligence. Sub-
~PI't ion (b) rPfPr~ to the subrogated property danzage 
claim 'rhirh "·a~ not adjudicated by plaintiff-insured. 
~·cprtainly if the assignor acts for another 
he 1nust account as trustee, however where the 
a~~ ignor does not do so he should be required to 
account for that ""hich he did not request and did 
not rPreiYf\ uor under u·hat appears to be the ex-
isting law does the insurer lose his right of action 
because the injured party failed to include the 
assignee's interest." (152 N.E. 2d at pages 924-
925: emphasis added.) 
The Ohio courts have followed the rule enunciated in 
thll TraYelPr~ Inden1nity ease, supra, and the Spargur 
~·a~t· ( ~npra). ~-\~ recently as April 24, 19'63, the court in 
Dul)(>se r. Lnzce. :?3 Ohio Ops. 2d 373, 189 N.E. 2d 923, 
rnlPd that plaintiffs release of defendant from liability 
fnr pPr~nna l injuri~s did not bar his subrogated insurance 
rotnpany from bringing an action for property damage 
tn the in~nred's automobile. At page 925, the court states: 
··. . . eYen though Ohio has adopted the sin-
gle rause of action theory-that there is but one 
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cause of action against a wrongdoer for injuries 
caused one person by a tort, an exception will 
be made for a subrogated insurer .... " 
See also Hoosifr Casualty Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St. 
5, 173 N.E. 2d 349 ( 1961) ; American Ins11rance Co. v. 
Ellsworth Freight Lines, Inc., 113 Ohio App. 426, 178 
N.E. 2d 819 (1960). 
In leading the trial court into error of law, Hi-Line 
relied heavily on the Michigan case referred to in Hi-
Line's memorandum, General Accident Fire and Life 
Assur. Corp. v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, 93 N.W. 2d 315. 
Aside from the harsh and inequitable result of that case, 
there are several important distinctions which show 
General Indemnity v. Sircey, should not be persuasive 
as a precedent in this case. 
First, the evils and weaknesses that flowed from the 
historic separation of law and equity jurisdictions re-
sulted in reform in many states, Utah included. 
"There shall be but one form of civil action, 
and law and equity may be administered in the 
same action." Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, 
Sec. 19. 
In l\fichigan that reform has not been made, and 
General Accident v. Sircey was decided on the law side, 
and equitable considerations were specifically excluded 
from the decision. The law side applied a strict, rigid and 
inflexible rule against splitting a cause of action, disre-
garding the equitable principles \Yhich produce excep-
tions or contrary rules in other jurisdictions. 
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Tht· itnportuneP of the fact that General Accident v. 
S ircry ea~P \ra~ triPd at la,,~, and not in equity, can be 
~"t'll hv the l':u·t that an entirPlv different rule regarding 
. . 
~plitting of eau~t·s of action is applied in the equity 
('ourt~ in ~lichigan. In LaBour r. J.l!ichigan r.;'at. Bank, 
335 ~I ich. ~~)S, 3;> ~. \Y. ~d 838, respondent had previously 
~ttt•d and <'ollPeh•d a judg1nent against one Hunt on one 
eount of a elaiin, but thL· other count was dismissed. Later 
Hunt "·pnt into bankruptcy, the bank sued again on the 
~t·eond count, and collected a verdict. Hunt's trustee, the 
uppPllant, sPt up the judgment in the former suit as a bar 
to a judg1nent in the second action. 1The court sitting in 
ehntH'Pry denied the defense, saying: 
HThe rule against splitting a cause of action 
is not a hard and fast one in courts of equity, and 
\\·ill not be enforced there unless justice requires 
its application in the particular case. * * *" (55 
x.,,TO ~d 838 at page 840.) 
~econd, the first trial in Michigan resulted in a de-
ft~n~P Yerdict, 'vith the issues of negligence and causation 
in defendanfs favor. In the Salt Lake County action the 
oppo~ite is true, and defendant's negligence admittedly 
i~ the ~olt> proxi1nate cause of the damage. 
Third, the decision in General Accident v. Sircey 
appear~ to rest upon a specific Michigan statute, Sec. 
61~.:2. 'vhich is apparently interpreted to mean that the 
a~~ignee shall intervene in an action brought by the 
a~~ ignor in tort. This reasoning is buttressed by the 
f:H·t that a scttlen1ent. not a judgn1ent, by the assignor 
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in Wolverine Ins. ()o. v. Klouzparcns, 273 ~lich. -!93, ~();~ 
N.W. 724 (1935) for part of the property damages, vvas 
not a bar to the insurance company's assignee's bringing 
an action for the remainder of the property damage claim 
which \vas assigned to it. 
Fourth, the J\Iiehigan court in its opinion gave stress 
to the fact that the plaintiff had not sustained its burden 
of proof on the custom among insurance companies to 
acquiesce in the separate settlement of subrogation 
clain1s. Unlike the Michigan case, in this appeal such a 
custom is admitted. 
Fifth, the Michigan court considered that the appel-
lee had not requested the appellant to delay in asserting 
its subrogation claim. The facts in the instant case re-
quire a different finding. 
D. Hi-Line's memorandum upon which the trial 
court based its erroneous adoption of the defendant's 
contentions consists generally of quotations lifted out 
of context, \Yhich do not apply to the type of factual 
situation here involved. ~fany of the general rules quoted 
by the defendant, in their proper application, may be 
a shield against injustice. The defendant here tries to 
convert the shield into a sword to be used for an unjust, 
unconscionable and inequitable purpose, the evasion of 
clear liability through the good faith reliance of the 
appellant induced by the representation of the defend-
ant's agent. 
~Iany of Hi-Line's citations in its memorandum are 
sin1pl~~ inapplicable. In the case of Mads en v. Mads en, 
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7~ l"tnh 9(i, ~fi91).1:~:! (19:!0), eitPd hy defendant involved 
lllPrPly a pleading quP~tion in a trover action and in no 
way involvPd a holding supporting the defendant's posi-
tion in thi~ <·asP. 
In thP <·a~P of ~._','nlith 'l:. Lenzi, 7--! (Ttah 362, 279 P. 893 
( lD:.!~)) involvPd an objection by a defendant because a 
t•lnitn l'or pPrsoiutl injury "·as not separated from a cause 
of H<'tion for property damage caused in the same acci-
dPnt. ThP languagP of the court there is inapplicable or 
JnPn· <li<'hnn so far as this case is concerned, for in the 
~1nith case the situation of an insurance subrogee and 
thP o\\·ner of the property was not involved. The case 
h- not in point. 
The rPfl'rPnCl' to Joyce v. J.llurphy Land Company, 
:;;)Idaho 549. ~OS P. 241 (1922) does not appear to be in 
}lni.nt. In that ea8P there had been a previous decree be-
twPPn thP ~arne parties dealing with the same subject 
tnattt·r, 'vnter rights, and the case does not involve an 
in8uranre-subrogation situation. 
The t'aH· of Iou·a n7atioual 1llutual Insurance Com-
JUIII.If r. lluntlc,lf, IS \\"'"yo. 380, 328 P.2d 569 (1958), re-
fPtTPd to in defendant'~ Ineinorandum of authorities con-
tnint~d ~tnte1nent~ \\·hich, "·hen considered in connection 
"·ith their context and the factual situation, are clearly 
inapplicable to the present situation. There the insurer's 
:'llhrngation clain1 "·as in fact included in the first suit, 
and not on1itted by agreement of the parties as in the 
pr~:'t·nt ease. The denial of the second suit involving the 
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very same item of damage previously litigated clearly 
distinguishes that case from the instant case. 
The case of Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 1()9 
P. 2d 777 ( 1946) may be clearly distinguished from the 
present action, for in that instance the claim of the sub-
rogee \vas included in the suit \Vherein the property 
owner sought recovery of his damages, and not excluded 
as here. The contention of the defendant that the subro-
gation claim must be excluded was rejected. The case 
also involved no actions by the defendant's agent to mis-
lead the subrogee, and a completely different factual sit-
uation, and different questions of law and equity. 
The holding of Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. 2d 507, 
58 P. 2d 6·62 ( 19H6) cited by defendant, proper on its 
peculiar facts, is inapplicable to the present case, where 
the facts and the equities differ so radically. Kidd v. 
Iiillrnan involved a fraudulent attempt to collect twice 
for the same items of damage. 
As might be expected, the broad language of that 
case has been restricted and distinguished in connection 
''Tith later California cases involving differing factual 
situations. 
See Board of Adn1iuistration, etc., v. Ames, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 917 (June 12, 1963) Subrogee allo\ved recovery 
after tortfeasor paid insured. 
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Calif. 
19-±5) separate recovery allowed for medical expenses 
after tortfeasor paid injured person. 
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,.'-,'andrrson 1'. ~Yicnuuu1. 17 ( 1al. 2d 563, 110 ]>. 2d 
lU~j ( 19-l-1) rl\ro ~PparatP recoveries allowed. 
Conunerl'ial Staudard In:::;. ( 10. v. Winfield, et al., 
( l'al. 1 ~l:~s). 7;) P. 2d ;)~3. rrortfPasor held to have ''Taived 
dPt'Pn~,. ag-ainst ~plitting a cause of action. 
l n sununary it i::; clear that in the case of an insur-
ant·e subrogation situation, recognition of the peculiar 
p robletn is necPssary. Although the jurisdictions do not 
all a~rPP in their language or in their theory, practically 
all do tnake allo'\vance for the problem peculiar to the 
~ituation, either by holding that there are two causes 
of aet ion, or that there is an exception to the general 
rule against splitting a cause of action, or that there is 
t·~toppel preventing the assertion of the defense against 
~plitting a cause of action, or that there is a consent or 
waiver pertnitting the separate handling of the right of 
thP property o\\Tner and the right of the subrogee. 
POINT TWO 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY kCTION OF DONALD RAY-
:\IER VS. HI-LINE TRANS·PORT, INC., IS NOT RES JUDI-
CAT A ON THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF MILLER~S' INSUR-
ANCE ASSOCIATION .. 
Plaintiff ~lillers' Mutual Insurance Association was 
not a party to the Salt Lake County action. Plaintiff 
aequired its subrogation right and was the owner of the 
claiin for $:2G-!:2.UO prior to Raymer's suit in Salt Lake 
l,ounty. and Raymer did not own that claim . 
. Even as bet"~een parties to the same action it is held 
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that estoppel of judgment does not extend to an issue not 
expressly put in issue and litigated to the first action. 
Itay v. Consolidated l?reightways, -! Utah 2d 137, 289 P. 
2d 196 (19·55). 
Res judicata would not extend further against a 
non-party. Not only was Millers' Mutual Insurance Assn. 
not joined as_ a party in the Salt Lake County suit, but 
the existence and amount of Millers' claim, and Millers' 
right to make recovery were not placed in issue or liti-
gated in the first action. 
The issues in this action were not joined in the Salt 
Lake County action with the knowledge and consent of, 
and at the request of Hi-Line and its authorized repre-
sentatives. 
Hi-Line observed and well knew the destruction of 
the new Buick exceeded the $50.00 deductible asked by 
Raymer and was on notice of the subrogation claim. The 
complaint served on Hi-Line gave it further notice. Cen-
tral Casualty and Homer Bray S-ervice, Inc., to whom 
Hi-Line had entrusted the authority and responsibility 
for negotiating the claims, had detailed and specific 
kno\v"ledge of the subrogation claim, and that knowledge 
is i1nputed to the principal, Hi-Line Transport, Inc. As 
agents they negotiated \Vith the subrogee and procured 
the forebearance and delay of plaintiff in pressing its 
claim, the better to allow Hi-Line's representatives to de-
fend I-Ii-Line in Raymer's Salt Lake ·County suit. 
The subrogation claim was not included in the Salt 
Lake County suit,. and Hi-Line and its representatives 
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\n·ll kru·w ~tH•ei t'ienlly that it "·as otnitted. Hi-Line knew 
thP Jlt•w lluiek \Vas de1noli~hed, and that the $50.00 asked 
hy Hayrnt•r \vas only his deductible, that a subrogation 
,·lainl \Vas outstanding, and the specific knowledge of the 
n.~Pnt ot' lli-Line authorized to conduct negotiations is 
ilnputable to lli-Line. 
~ineP thP rights of l\lillers' l\lutual Insurance Associ-
ation werP not n1ade an issue in or adjudicated by the Salt 
l.akt~ County aetion, Millers' Mutual Insurance Associa-
tion ~hould be giYen its day in court now. Hi-Line's at-
t~nlpt to deny the appellant's claim a hearing on its 
nwrits, after the good faith shown by appellant, is sharp-
dPaling. 
l{pferl•nep is made to the discussion of Rule 84 of 
tht· Re~tatPtnent of Judgments in Point One, pages 20-21 
of thi~ brief. Under the Restatement the most application 
the ~alt Lake County action would have as res judicata 
in thi~ aetion \Vould be a determination adverse to Hi-
Line of the issues of negligence and proximate cause, a 
re~ ult in harmony \Yith the stipulation. Under Section 
"~ (h) of R.Pstatement of Judgments the ownership and 
nrnount of the plaintiff's subrogation claim would not 
hP re~ judicata. Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co. 
\8Upra). 
South Dakota rejected res judicata as a defense in an 
in~nrance-subrogation situation where two suits were 
filed against a tortfeasor, one for damage to cargo, and 
ont• for drunage to the truck damaged in the same acci-
rlPnt. Sodak Distributing Co. r. TTTayne, 77 S.D. 496, 93 
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N. W. :2d 791 ( 1958). The insured first instituted an action 
for damages to his truck. The insurer-subrogee then 
instituted a separate action for damaged cargo. In both 
actions, respondent \Yas represented by the same counsel, 
as were insured and insurer. The insurer's case reached 
judgment first, and the insurer collected damages for the 
damaging of the cargo. Respondent's counsel then raised 
the defense of res judicata in the suit of the insured. The 
trial court recognized this defense and was reversed. On 
appeal, all judges concurred in rejecting the defense of 
res judicata in the case of insurance subrogations, al-
though South Dakota otherwise adheres strictly to the 
rule against splitting of claims. The court stated its 
reasons for allowing such an exception as follows: 
"The practices of insuring against the dan-
gers of financial liability inherent in modern liv-
ing has enjoyed a phenomenal growth in tlH· last 
decade or two. In fact, in many quarters it is re-
garded as a device by \vhich an individual shares 
such risks \Yith others. This development is <'Y~'n 
more pronounced 'vhere motor vehicles are in-
volved. As to them publie liability and property 
dan1age insurance coverage is required in many 
states by law. It seems to us that the rule \Ve have 
adopted is attuned to this condition. See Under-
\vood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 1±7 S. E. 686, 64 
A.L.R. 65,6. Those jurisdictions which do not rec-
ognize the exception do so principally on the 
ground that the defendant should not be . sub-
jected to more than one suit by reason of a ~nngle 
tort However, in this connection it should be noted 
that the development of the insurance concept has 
had an i1npact on such defendants. The burdens 
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of their status arc uo1r iurr('asiugly assllJncd by 
insurers." (93 N.W. 2d 791 at page 794.) 
POINT THREtE 
EVEN HAD DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ANY RIGHT 
TO HAVE PLAINTIFF'S SUBROGATION CLAJM TRIED IN 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ACTION RATHER T'HAN SEP A-
RATELY, DEFENDANT- RESPONDENT WAIVED SUCH 
RIGHT BY INDUCING PLAINTIFF TO WITHHOLD LEGAL 
ACTION . 
..:\~~tuning for the purpose of argument that defend-
nut did have the right to have the subrogation action 
triPtl in thP Salt ·L.ake County action with Raymer's claim 
for p~r~onal injury and $50.00 deductible, Hi-Line still 
~hould not Pscape its liability to plaintiff. It gave 
authority and responsibility to Central Casualty and the 
adju~tt~r, Homer Bray Service, Inc., to adjust, investigate 
and defPnd the accident and resulting claims. 
~Liller~· put the question squarely and specifically 
to Hi-Line's designated agents in the letter in Record 27, 
~tating in substance: Will you honor our claim on its 
nterits later·? Tell us now because if you will not honor 
our elai1n later \\·e 'Yill sue now. 
lTnder a duty to give a clear answer to such a ques-
tion, Hi-Line's representative said in substance: You do 
not n~Pd to sue no,v. Please wait until later. We will 
honor your clain1 separately on its merits after the per-
sonal injury action is disposed of. 
l)aragraph three of the Court's Conclusions of Law 
~~ contrary to the facts and the la,v. The letters of 
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Ho1ner Bray Service, Inc., and ~Iillers' ~l utual InsuraneP 
Association (Record 27 and 28) show that Homer Bray 
Service, Inc., acting as agent for the ·Tortfeasor-
Respondent, induced Millers' ~lutual Insurance Associ-
ation to refrain from setting forth the subrogation claim 
in the Salt Lake County litigation, and waived any de-
fense of res judicata or splitting a cause of action. Mil-
lers' l\futual Insurance Association advised Homer Bray 
by a letter of February 17, 1961, "In the absence of some 
assurance that Central ·Casualty will consider our subro-
gation claim after the other cases are out of the way, we 
will naturally be forced to take other action to protect 
our interest." 
In reply Homer Bray Service, Inc. stated: ''You are 
correct. We have not been able to dispose of the injury 
claims and when they are out of the way we will certainly 
be ntore than happy to give your subrogation claim con-
side ration." D·oes that language indicate that when the 
injury claims are out of the way that ~fillers' can expect 
to have the claims of res judicata, splitting a cause of ac-
tion, asserted f Quite the contrary is true. The Homer 
Bray letter also said: " ... and we shall appreciate re-
ceiving photostatic copy of your proof of loss together 
"rith draft in payment." Why would the agent for the 
Tortfeasor-Respondent entrusted with the responsibility 
for the negotiation of the subrogation claim request a 
photostatic copy of the proof of loss and the draft in pay-
Inent if the claimed defenses of res judicata and split-
ting a cause of action "\Yere to be asserted~ The clear 
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~tntl•lllt'llt hy t1H' agPnt for thP Tortfeasor-Respondent 
tl1at wlH'Il thP injury clainu.; \\·Pre out of the way "we will 
certainly hP tnon' thnn happy to give your subrogation 
··lniln <·on:.- i<lPrat ion'' and requesting copies of the proof 
of lP:-'~ and t hP paytnent draft by the subrogee can mean 
only that th~ Tortfeasor consented that the subrogation 
twtion be dPalt "·ith separately, and that the subrogee 
would not be prejudiced by virtue of its cooperation, for 
which llotner Bray Service, Inc., so warmly thanked 
tlw ~ubrogee in its letter of February 22, 1961. 
To allo'v the Tortfeasor to repudiate that waiver and 
havP the benefit of the third ·Conclusion of Law would be 
to eonvPrt a shield for use in appropriate cases to a 
~word for defrauding Millers' Mutual Insurance Associa-
tion of its elai1n for damage caused by the negligence of 
thP Tortfeasor. 
.. . . . It has been held that a wrongdoer, by 
his action, 1nay acquiesce in the splitting of causes 
of action for injuries and property damage result-
ing from the same collision." Appleman on Insur-
ance,,.,. ol. 6, § 4092, pages 584-586. 
HTort-feasors making settlement with injured 
person \vith full knowledge of prior payment 
1nade injured person by his collision insurer ac-
quiesced in splitting of causes of action for in-
jurie~ and for property damage resulting from 
collision." Wolrerine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens 1935 
' ' ~63 X.\\T. 7:2-!, 273 :Jiich. 49.3. 
··Prohibition against splitting a cause of action is for 
th(l benefit of the defendant and he may \\""aive or re-
nounce it by agreement." In facts ahnost identical to the 
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instant case, the request of the tortfeasor's liability insur-
ance company that the subrogee forbear in intervening 
in personal injury action, was held to be binding on the 
tortfeasor as waiver of the defense against splitting a 
cause of action, and the tortfeasor \\~as estopped from 
asserting such a defense in a later action by the subrogee. 
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield, et al. (Calif. 
1938) 75 P. 2d 525. 
McCaffrey v. Wiley, (Calif., 19'51) 230 P. 2d 152, 155 
stated: 
"It has been held that the prohibition against 
splitting of an action does not apply 'vhere the 
particular issue was specifically withdrawn or 
reserved for future litigation in the prior action. 
Coburn v. Goodall, 72 ·Cal. 498, 14 P. 190; Panos 
v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 
134 P. 2d 242, 2-!-±." 
It is not necessary that a tortfeasor personally do 
the act 'vhich constitutes waiver of a defense. The acts 
of the insurance company and its adjusters are binding 
upon the insured. The act of the adjuster as agent may 
estop the tortfeasor from asserting a defense. 
Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.~C. 255, 125 S.E. 2d 580 
held that notice to an adjuster for defendant's insurance 
carrier was notice binding upon defendant. 
" ( T) he adjuster for defendants' insurance 
carrier 'vas on notice of the subrogation rights of 
An1erican Security Insurance ~Co., and . . . this 
kno'v ledge of said adjuster is imputed to defend-
ant ... " (125 S.E. 2d 580 at page 582). 
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"lh·t'Pndant ('OiltPIHl~ hi~ liability insurance 
carri(·r \Vas \rithout authority to act for him in 
tnaking the ~PttlPlllPnt "·ith and taking a releasP 
fro1n l'hillip~ ... (Citations) 1 Le Inisapprehends 
tht· purport of those decisions. True, a liability 
<·arrier <·aniH>t i1npair the rights of the insured 
hy ~Pttling his rlai1n 'vithout his authority. No 
suggestion is made here that defendant lost any 
rights by the sPttlPHtPnt. To the contrary he as-
sPrts right~ n·sulting fro1n the settlement. ,, ... hen 
he does so, he ratifies the aet of the person mak-
ing the ~Ptt lPinent. He cannot accept the benefits 
and reJect the obligations." ( 125 S.E. 2d 580 at 
pages 583-584; emphasis added.) 
,'-,'fl/J.If r. T7 icfuria 11/iHcs, 12-! ~lont. 321, 221 P. 2d 423 
(lHrlO) has Inany close similarities to the instant case. It 
was h~ld that .Jl r. Dobler, adjuster for defendants' insur-
atH'P eontpnny. \ras the agent of the defendant so as to 
hind d~fendnnt to pay plaintiff's claim. 
The language in defendants' policy authorizing the 
in~nraneP co1npany to investigate, negotiate and defend 
the elaiiu i~ yery silnilar to Hi-Line's policy. Defendant 
by it~ actions entrusted the negotiation to the insurance 
enntpan~· ju~t a~ Hi-Line did. The adjuster, like Homer 
Bray ~t'rYice. Inc .. \Vrote to plaintiff's attorney, HI do 
not fPPl that 1 ran take any responsibility so far as the 
drunagt· to ~[r. ~lPhy·~ (the plaintiff) car is concerned 
until thL' question of personal injury claims have been 
dt~t(lrinined." 
"'The action is based upon the promises made 
by ~Ir. Dobler. the adjuster for the insurance com-
pany, the plaintiff alleging that the defendant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
was bound by such promises and the defendant 
denying that nlr. Dobler represented the defend-
ant corporation, and alleging that Mr. Dobler's 
promises, if any, \Vere made on behalf of the 
Standard Accident Insurance Company, and not 
on behalf of the defendant corporation." (221 P. 
2d at page 424.) 
In holding that the adjuster's pro1nises and repre-
sentations were binding upon the tortfeasor-defendant, 
the Supreme Court of Montana quoted the following 
language: 
"He cannot turn over to an insurer the whole 
management of the subject of settlements in his 
behalf and accept the benefit of the insurer's ef-
forts when they are successful and relieve him 
from liability but repudiate their consequences 
when they affect his defense adversely. It is no 
answer to say the company acts in its own behalf, 
and that the defendant cannot control its conduct. 
It does act in its o"Tn behalf, but it also acts 
in behalf of the defendant to the extent of his 
interest in the defense, although by the terms of 
th·e contract the company may exercise its own 
judgment to its own advantage uncontrolled by 
the defendant." (Id. at page 427.) 
In the case of Keller v. K eklikian, Mo., 244 S.W. 2d 
1001 ( 1951) an insured turned over to his insurance com-
pany a suit against hi1n arising out of an accident and 
the adjuster for the insurance company entered into a 
stipulation releasing the insured's claims against the 
other party. Under those circumstances the Supre1ne 
Court of 1\lissouri held that the insured was bound by 
the action of the insurance adjuster on the grounds that 
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the ,·oiHpany and its adjustPrs and la"~yers were the au-
tllori~Pd n.gPnts of the i11sur('d and acted for and in his 
hPhalf. 
/)urk r. 1lloornutn Jlfg. C'o., 1~1 Utah 339, 241 P. 2d 
!tl~ ut pag(' ~~19 <'itPs ,,·ith approval Mechem on Agency, 
~,.,.t ion 17S 1 : 
"\ Y he rever the doing of a certain act or the 
t ransnetion of a given affair or the performance 
of eertain business is confided to an agent, the 
authority to so act will, in accordance with a gen-
Pral rule often referred to, carry "\Yith it by impli-
cation the authority to do all of the collateral 
acb; ,,·hich are the natural and ordinary incidents 
o fthe main act or business authorized. " 
POINT FOUR 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-TORTFEASO·R IS ESTOP-
PED TO ASSERT CLAIMED DEFENSE1S OF &ES JUDICATA 
AND SPLITTING OF A ~CAUSE OF ~CTION. 
That the negligence of Hi-Line Transport, Inc., was 
th(\ sole proximate cause of damage in the stipulated 
runount to the plaintiff is agreed. The liability of the de-
f,·udant is clear in fact and extent. The general question 
which defendat raises in defense in this action is "\vhether 
th{' ~nh~equent actions of the defendant's representatives, 
and the ~nbsequent actions of the plaintiff performed in 
relianel~ upon the actions of defendant's representatives, 
"·ill ano,y the defendant to escape its clear liability. 
Defendant seeks to escape liability by adopting and 
relying- upon the action of defendant's representatives, 
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Ho1ner Bray Service, Inc., and the actions of the plain-
tiff induced thereby. 
The power of this court includes equity as well as 
la\v, and the decision of the issues presented by this 
appeal properly involves the application of equitable 
principles as well as legal principles. 
The defendant should be estopped to assert the al-
leged defenses of res judicata and splitting of a cause of 
action. To raise those defenses Hi-Line must necessarily 
adopt and rely upon the actions of defendant's repre-
sentatives. Those actions induced the plaintiff in good 
faith to refrain from joining its claim in the Salt Lake 
County action. 
The actions of an insurance adjuster for a liability 
carrier were held to estop the insured under a liability 
policy from asserting the defense of the statute of limita-
tions. In MacKeen v. Kasinskas, Mass., 132 N.E. 2d 732 
( 1956), the representation of the adjuster that the plain-
tiff \vould not need to bring suit to recover induced the 
plaintiff to let the statute of limitations run. The court 
stated: 
· "The sole question presented to us is ·w'hether 
the evidence would warrant a finding that the 
defendant was estopped from setting up the stat-
ute as a defense by reason of the conduct of one 
Hughes, an adjuster for an insurance company 
'vhich had issued a certificate . . . covering the 
auton1obile operated by the defendant. There w·as 
no error. * * * 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
,,rrhP plaintiffs ('ontPnd that becaust' of these 
rPpr(·~untations of llughP~ they \\'Pre induced to 
rPt'rain fro1n consulting a lawyer and from insti-
tuting a ~uit to l'('eov<.•r for their injuries. They 
a~~Pit that, by rPason of this conduct of the ad-
ju~h·r, thP clefPndant and the company which cov-
•·n·d thP auto1nobile she \\·as operating are estop-
l H'(l from ~Ptting up the statute of limitations. We 
ag-rc·•· ,,·ith this contention . 
. . . "'The only authority which the agent need 
have to constitute his conduct an estoppel is the 
authority to pron1ise a settlement. It is clear that 
all insuraneP adjusters have at least apparent 
authority to 1nake promises of settlement. 'The 
prineipal function of insurance company adjust-
Prs is to determine the liability of the insured 
and to 1nake arrangements for settling claims. . . 
··In ~lcLearn v. Hill, supra, 276 Mass. at page 
;l:2-t, 177 N.E. at page 619, it was said that it was 
not necessary to charge deceit, bad faith or actual 
fraud. ·Facts falling short of these elements may 
eon~titute contrary to general principles of fair 
dealing and to the good conscience which ought to 
actuate individuals and \Yhich it is the design of 
eon rts to enforce. It is in the main to accomplish 
the 1n·pvention of results contrary to good con-
~eience and fair dealing that the doctrine of es-
toppel ha~ been formulated and taken its place 
a~ a part of the la\Y.' We think that the facts set 
forth in the case at bar bring it \\Tithin the doctrine 
of estoppel as thus defined." (132 N.E. 2d 732 at 
ragps 733-734.) 
~t'P al:-'n Connnercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield 
et al (supra) (Calif. 1938) 73 P. 2d 3:23~ W"here in a factual 
~ituation practically identical to this case on appeal, the 
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tortfeasor \vas held estopped to assert against a subrogee 
the defense against splitting a cause of action because 
of the request by the liability carrier that the subrogee 
not intervene in the personal injury action. 
No Utah case has been found involving identical 
facts .. The case of Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 29,3, ~G.f 
Pac. 784 ( 1927) did however clearly recognize the prin-
ciple that a person may be estopped from asserting a 
defense by reason of conduct for which that party is re-
sponsible. Badger v. Badger was a divorce matter and 
the f~cts are dissimilar, but the principle is very much 
in point. Headnote 3, page 293 of 69 Utah, summarizes 
the rule as follows : 
"While generally a party cannot split a single 
demand into separate causes of action, if by acci-
dent, excusable neglect, 1nistake, or fraud by his 
adversary, and \vithout pleaders fault, he splits 
single cause of action, adjudication in respect to 
one will not bar suit on the other." 
Again, in a very different factual situation, the Su-
prerne Court of Utah recognized that one may not ac-
cept the beneficial portion of his agent's actions and re-
ject the detrimental part. Moses v. Archie MacFarland 
Company;119 Utah 602, 230 P. 2d 271 (1951). The court 
there held also that the principal may not avoid ratifying 
his agent's actions by remaining willfully ignorant or 
shutting his eyes to information. 
The respondent's arguments on limitations on the 
authority of a liability carrier as agent are not appli-
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t•ahh· to this ~ituntion. Such li1nitations are intended to 
pn·vPnt thP agent fro1n acting prejudicially toward the 
io~un·d by ad1nitting liability ""here a question of lia-
bility exi~t~, or by admitting thP amount of damages 
w hert• dntnagP~ are unliquidated and disputed in amount. 
Thi~ <·on~ideration is absent in the instant case where 
linhility is undi~puted and stipulated, and where the 
nn1ount of damages is liquidated and undisputed. The 
dllfPndant-torfeasor-respondent here is really asserting 
that his agent, the insurance adjuster, had the power to 
tni~lt~ad the plaintiff-subrogee to the subrogee's detri-
DlPnt, and to confer a benefit upon the tortfeasor-
n\~pondent by extinguishing the tortfeasor's existing li~­
bility to thP subrogee. No problem of exceeding authority 
really Pxi~ts. The tortfeasor-defendant here seeks to 
ratify and profit by the actions of the agent where bene-
firial to the tortfeasor, and divorce itself from any of the 
obligations or disadvantageous consequences arising 
fron1 the agent's acts. The tortfeasor-respondent's posi-
tion boil~ down to this: the tortfeasor asks the court to 
conf~r an unjust enrichment upon the tortfeasor by extin-
gui~hing the liability of the tortfeasor to the subrogee, 
heean~tl of the tortfeasor's agents induced the subrogee 
to refrain from bringing suit by the assurance that the 
~ubrogation claim would be dealt with on its merits upon 
eonelusion of Raymer's personal injury action in Salt 
l.ake County. 
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POINT FIVE 
PLAIN'TIFF-APPELLAN'T IS ENTITLED TO JUDG-
MENT AGAINST DEFENDANT-RlErSPO·NDENT AS PRAYED 
IN COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AS STIPULATED. 
Since it is stipulated that the negligence of Hi-Line 
Transport, Inc. \\Tas the sole proximate cause of darnage 
paid by plaintiff in the sum of $2:642.00 it follows that 
Plaintiff-Subrogee is entitled to judgment as prayed in 
the complaint, together with costs. 
When the negligence of the defendant produced the 
damage the plaintiff became liable to Raymer for the 
arnount actually paid by the plaintiff, and in turn there 
arose a clear, unmistakable liability of the defendant to 
the plaintiff for $2642.00. 
It "\Vould indeed be a distortion of justice and equity 
to rP\\Tard Hi-Line by relieving it of liability, and puni~h 
thP plaintiff by depriving plaintiff of its just dues lw-
cause the defendant's representatives induced the plain-
tiff to refrain from joining in the Salt 1Lake County legal 
action. Plaintiff would have joined in that action had it 
not been for the assurances of defendant's agents, in the 
letter in the Record, page :28. .A.cting in good faith, the 
plaintiff refrained frorn joining that action upon the 
clear representation of Homer Bray Service, Inc. in 
8tating ( Reeord :28) ""You are correct. \Y-e have not been 
able is dispose of the injury claims and when they are 
out of the "\vay "\Ye will certainly be more than happy to 
giy·p )Tour subrogation claims consideration." To now 
allo,, .. the defendant to repudiate the acts of its repre-
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:--•·nhttiYPS aftPr <·au~ing and allo,Ying then1 to act in its 
behalf. b{\enusP dPfendant has obtained the advantage 
t'rotu tht'i r rPpresPntation and no'v \\'ishes to repudiate 
tlw disadvantages of that representation, would be a re-
ward and t'ncourngenH'nt of fraud and unconscienable 
dtaling . 
. \ dPei~ion for plaintiff "~ill be good public policy. 
Fi r:-;t, it is g(lnerally recognized that appellate courts 
tuu~t hP alert to assure that all classes of litigants, in-
~urnn('P cotnpani(:ls included, receive no more and no less 
thnn a fair and impartial application of law and equity. 
,) uriP~ and judges should accord an insurance company 
nPither tnore nor less than a fair 1neasure of justice. 
RecPivership of Central Casualty ·C·ompany is a 
renlinder that insurance companies do not represent an 
inexhaustible supply of wealth, and that public interest 
rPqui rP~ that solvency of insurers be protected by: 
a. Fair treatment of insurers in litigation, 'vithout 
prejudice because they are insurance companies. 
h. Permitting subrogation recovery fro1n responsi-
hk tortfea~ors in appropriate cases by a fair application 
of e~tahlished rules concerning liability and damages. 
e. Encouraging traffic safety by legal imposition 
of financial responsibility for loss on those whose negli-
gence ~auses the loss. 
~t.\eond. much litigation is avoided by the practice 
ot' insurance con1panies in ""'ithholding suit on subro-
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gation claims to await settle1nent or othPr disposition of 
personal injury claims. \ v· ere the companies, in order to 
protect their interest, rPquired to file suit rather than 
''rait on such claims, n1uch additional litigation \Vould 
be filed in the courts, and the process of amicable nego-
tiation and settlement \Yould be discouraged and hanl-
pered. 
The judgment should be reversed with directions to 
enter judgment for plaintiff as prayed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ROYAL ANDREAS.E.N 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
914-916 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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